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E-commerce applications have flourished on the Internet because of their ability to 
perform secure transactions in which the identities of the two parties could be verified 
and the communications between them encrypted. The Transport Layer Security (TLS) 
protocol is implemented to make secure transactions p s ible by creating a secure tunnel 
between the user’s browser and the server with the elp of Certificate Authorities (CAs). 
CAs are a third party that can be trusted by both the user’s browser and the server and are 
responsible for establishing secured communication between them. The major limitation 
of this model is the use of CAs as single points of trust that can introduce severe security 
breaches globally. In my thesis, I provide a high-level design for a new protocol in the 
application layer of the TCP/IP suite that will build a secure tunnel between the user’s 
browser and the server without the involvement of any third party. My proposed protocol 
is called User-Defined Key Pair (UDKP), and its objective is to build a secure tunnel 
between the user’s browser and the server using a public/private key pair generated for 
the user on the fly inside the user’s browser based on the user credential information. 
This key pair will be used by the protocol instead of the server certificate as the starting 
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The average person has now become more dependent on the Internet in their daily life, 
allowing a wealth of information to be derived from Internet traffic. This information 
motivates malicious users to develop new techniques to steal that information; therefore, 
Internet traffic requires a mechanism to prevent eavesdropping, tampering and spoofing 
attacks. The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol pr vides this type of Internet 
protection by creating an encrypted tunnel based on the public key infrastructure (PKI) 
technology. PKI allows two parties without a previous relationship to use Certificate 
Authorities (CAs) to share the security parameters r quired to create a secured tunnel 
between them [1]. A CA is the organization that issues and manages the security 
credentials and certificates required for verifying the identities of the involved parties. 
Browser vendors usually embed a copy of the root certifi ates for a set of CAs that they 
decide to trust, which helps the end user in deciding whether to trust a particular 
certificate. When a browser receives a website certifi ate that is signed by one of those 
CAs, it will automatically trust the website on behalf of the user. As one final check, 
browsers can use the information in both the websit certificate and the certificate of the 
CA to verify that the certificate has not been revoked by the CA. 
Although PKI has been widely deployed and is used in most secured websites, security 
professionals have expressed numerous concerns regarding the nature of CAs as a single 
point of trust. Specifically, if the CAs were compromised, severe security damages could 
occur and many users would be at risk. Incidents in he past have revealed multiple types 
of attacks upon CAs: those related to the failure of domain validation resulting in the 
issuance of domain certificates to individuals who are not the domain owner and those 
related to the malicious control of the computing resources maintained by CAs. As a 
result of these breaches, attackers were able to fraudulently acquire trusted certificates for 
different domains and services, allowing the attackers to transparently execute a man-in-
the-middle (MITM) attack to view and manipulate thedata being exchanged [2]. 
In my research, I will provide a high-level design for a new protocol in the application 
layer of the TCP/IP suite that will create a secured tunnel between the user’s browser and 
the server. My protocol targets the issue of using the CA as a single point of trust. Instead 
of starting the process by receiving a certificate from the server that needs to be verified 
by the CA, I will start the process from the user, who will send the server a message 
signed with his private key generated on the fly from his credential information. The 
signed message only needs to be verified by the serv r with the corresponding public key, 
after which the session key will be generated by the server, encrypted with the user’s 
public key and communicated to the user.  
 
PKI Related Issues 
Although PKI has been widely deployed and is used in most secured websites, security 
professionals have expressed many concerns regardin the nature of CAs as a single 
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point of trust. Various incidents that have occurred veal different types of 
vulnerabilities in the PKI security model. Some of these incidents are related to a lack of 
domain validation, resulting in the issuance of domain certificates to individuals who are 
not the domain owner. Other incidents are caused by failing to validate the certificate, 
which results in the acceptance of a malicious certifica e as a valid one. Still other 
incidents are related to the malicious control of the computing resources maintained by 
CAs. As a result of these breaches, attackers were able to fraudulently acquire trusted 
certificates for different domains and services, allowing them to transparently execute a 
man-in the-middle (MITM) attack to view and manipulate the data being exchanged [2].
Domain Validation Issues 
Domain-validated certificates validate the ownership and control of the domain. They can 
be issued from different CAs, sometimes with long life times. If the ownership of the 
domain moves from one owner to other, it is possible that the previous owner has a 
domain-validated certificate for the domain from a different CA. This certificate could be 
used in conjunction with either a phishing attack or a DNS spoofing attack to masquerade 
as a legitimate site and bypass the protection afforded by TLS. 
Certain certificates can function as wildcard certificates that are issued for *.x.com, in 
which case the certificate will be valid for me.x.com and you.x.com. A related issue with 
this feature is that the CA only verifies the ownership and control of the x.com domain, 
so a malicious user may issue a certificate for amazon.x.com and use it as a basis for 
phishing attacks on amazon users. 
One of the techniques used to verify the ownership of a domain is the use of an email 
challenge-response mechanism to verify that the SSL certificate subscriber owns or 
controls the domain that he asks to include in the certificate. This verification is achieved 
by allowing the subscriber to select an address from a predetermined list including the 
admin, root, and administrator addresses. If this list is not carefully made—for example, 
if it includes email addresses that could be created for normal website users—other users 
could obtain a domain-validated certificate [12]. 
Certificate Validation Issues 
There are also issues related to the validation of the certificate at the client side. One 
popularized issue is the null prefix attack that was publicly disclosed in 2009 and 
impacted a number of applications, such as popular web browsers, instant messaging 
applications, and email clients. In this attack, the attacker tricks the impacted application 
into validating his website certificate as if it were the certificate of the target website. For 
example, if we want to transparently run an MITM attack against paypal.com, we would 
need a valid certificate for “paypal.com”, which we cannot obtain because we do not own 
the paypal.com domain. However, we could obtain a valid certificate for the URL 
“paypal.com\0.attackersite.com” if we own the domain “attackersite.com”. Now the 
attacker, being MITM, will send the certificate tha has been issued by a trusted CA to the 
browser, and the browser will compare the destinatio  URL and Subject field of the 
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Certificate to authenticate the server. Vulnerable browsers will use the code in (figure 1) 
for comparison. The strcmp function will check every character of these values till it 
reaches the end of the string denoted by nocharacter “\0”. In other words, the browser 
will consider “paypal.com\0.attackersite.com” equal to “paypal.com”, and it will 
accordingly accept the attacker certificate as if it were a paypal.com certificate [13]. 
 
Figure 1: Vulnerable Certificate validation code "Source: 
http://palpapers.plynt.com/issues/2010Feb/null-prefix-attack/" 
 
CA Computing Resources Attacks 
Certificate authorities and registration authorities are the main source of trust in PKI; they 
are the groups that are responsible for investigatin  the legitimacy of and endorsing 
certificate requesters. This endorsement gives the requester full control over the traffic 
related to the domain given in the subject field of the certificate and thus the ability to 
capture sensitive data. Despite existing security measurements and security hardening, 
attackers were able to enter the CAs infrastructure and issue themselves valid TLS 
certificates for a series of famous domains that they did not control, such as Google, 
Yahoo, and Mozilla. 
Attacks on DigiNotar and Comodo are well-known examples of the malicious control of 
CA computing resources to acquire valid certificates for high-value domains. In the case 
of Comodo, the hacker, calling himself "Ich Sun," stated that he broke into Comodo Italy 
using a very common database attack known as SQL injection, allowing him to execute 
commands on the backend database server that are supposed to be prohibited. He then 
took advantage of another flaw to obtain remote access to the system and eventually 
found a password hard-coded into a file on one of the systems that ultimately allowed 




User Reaction to Un-trusted Certificates 
People are always considered to be the weakest point in the security system. Although 
PKI is publicly used, browsers still need to accept cer ificates that are not trusted and 
deliver a warning to the user to warn him of the risks associated with visiting websites 
with untrusted certificates. These warnings are comm n for many employees who use 
intranet services provided by their organizations that do not pay yearly fees to protect 
their intranet services, oftentimes because they believe that these services are already 
protected by other in-place security measurements such as firewalls, intrusion detection, 
intrusion prevention, and anti-viruses. When people become accustomed to ignoring 
warnings generated from untrusted certificates, they will be more likely to ignore 
warnings generated from real MITM attack. 
 
Related Work 
There has been an increased rate of security breaches against CAs, which has prompted 
browser vendors, CAs and independent groups to start working on innovative solutions 
and workarounds to mitigate the risks associated with the use of CAs. Significant efforts 
have been made in this area, which I will describe in this section of the proposal. 
 
Convergence 
A new model for authentication, known as Convergence, was released by Moxie 
Marlinspike in August 2011 and is based on previous work from Carnegie Mellon 
University called the Perspectives Project [3]. Rather than trusting a hard-coded list of 
CAs, Convergence allows users to configure a dynamic set of Notary Servers to validate 
the client connection. When a client receives an https certificate from a site, it will 
contact the Notaries and provide the host name, aftr which the Notaries will contact the 
site, receive its certificate and forward it back to the client. If the client receives a 
certificate that is different from everywhere else, it is likely that the certificate is 
fraudulent. Convergence provides a trust agility in which any browser could easily ship a 
default set of Notaries and then update them as needed without affecting the 
functionality, which cannot be performed with the current PKI implementation. For 
example, even if there is an issue with Comodo certificates, Comodo cannot be disabled 
because a quarter of the web would also be disabled; on the other hand, the Notaries can 
easily be replaced without affecting functionality [4]. However, Adam Langley, a Google 
security researcher, stated that he does not think Convergence will be added to Chrome 
because 99.99% of users would never change the default Convergence settings, which 






Certificate Patrol is a plug-in implemented in Mozilla Firefox [6] that utilizes the fact that 
website certificates change infrequently, with normal lifetimes of three to five years. The 
key idea of Certificate Patrol is to build a dynamic apping within the browser or in an 
external database that maps TLS certificates to websites. A warning alarm is then raised 
whenever the browser receives a different certificae for one of the websites in the map. 
This solution does not require any change to the PKI because it is a plug-in that monitors 
all SSL connections and determines if the certificate in question has been changed [6]. 
Although Certificate Patrol is good in concept, enterprise servers such as Google change 
the certificate frequently, which would confuse theus r with frequent warning messages 
and cause the user to ignore those warnings. 
 
Origin Bound Certificate (OBC) 
Origin Bound Certificate (OBC) is a newly submitted RFC [7]; four researchers at 
Google presented a new extension to the TLS protocol by using a client certificate 
created on the fly by the browser without any user interaction. OBC does not include any 
information about the user and is sent to the server during the TLS handshake phase. The 
server binds the OBC to the authentication cookie lat r in the procedure. (See figure 2.) 
 
Figure 2: TLS-OBC handshake "Source: 
https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity12/sec12-final162.pdf" 
On subsequent visits to the website, the browser will send the existing OBC to the server, 
which must verify that the public key in the certificate corresponds to the key used to 
authenticate the client in the handshake. Thus, the MITM will have to send a new OBC 
because he lacks the ability to forge the client’s OBC, and the new OBC will be detected 
when the MITM forwards the user cookies to the server. (See figure 3.) 
This approach cannot protect the first time the user accesses the website or the first visit 
after the browser cookies are cleared, either by the legitimate user or by the MITM, but 
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the browser can generate an alarm 








Figure 3: Using OBCs and bound cookies to protect against MITM. The server 
recognizes a mismatch between the OBC to which the cookie is bound and the 
certificate of the client (attacker) with whom it is communicating. "Source: 
https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity12/sec12
 
The next set of approaches u es
itself or the official Certificate 
records are not digitally signed, which allows malicious users to easily manipulate DNS 
records and poison the DNS cache. Thus, 
extension (DNS-SEC).  
 
Certificate Policy Framework (CPF)
Certificate Policy Framework (CPF) was proposed in research published 
Lidestri in January 2012 [8]. CPF offers a mechanism for the service operators 
which certificates are authorized to authenticate their services, 
DNS record (CPF). CPF gives the service operator the flexibility to define an access 
control list for each host name 
which certificates merit alerts to the user or 
compatible application can query DNS for CPF records to verify the integrity of the 
certificate. 
These actions are represented by the following qualifiers:
(+) Pass: Permit the connection. This qualifier canbe omitted because it is the default 
qualifier. 
for the user at that time stating that the connection is 
 
-final162.pdf
 DNS records to retrieve either the official certificate 
Authority that issued the certificate for the we
these approaches need to use the DNS Security 
 
by Matthew 
with the help of a new 
that declares which certificates should be passed 









(-) Fail: Block the connection and do not offer the user with a means to override.
(˜) SoftFail: Warn the user but allow them to override the error at their discretion.
A sample domain zone file for hostname “example.com” is shown in figure 
Figure 4: sample dom
https://ritdml.rit.edu/bitstream/handle/1850/15220/MLidestriThesis2
 
In this example, the domain name www.example.com
SHA-1 hash of 6a0e9a60583c365eedafad7f4010965515dc014a
SHA-1 hash of 42ac0d3e30198c893a1f301939ace903019355ec and soft
certificate representing the domain.
 
Certification Authority Authorization (CAA)
One of the main issues with the current PKI implementation is that 
any browsers’ trusted CAs or their children could be usd to issue fake certificates to any 
https-protected site because browsers will blindly trust certificates signed by any of the 
trusted CAs. Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) DNS Resource Record is a 
new technique to reduce this risk by allowing the website operators to specify which 
public CA can issue certificates for their domains [9].Although this will significantly 
reduce the risk of being dependent on the security of all browser
depending only on the security of the authorized CA, the authorized CA 
compromised, which would place
at risk. 
 
 DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE)
DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) is a working group 
developing a protocol that would allow
Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC). DANE allows website operators 
to store a copy of the SSL certificate directly in the DNS record for their websites, so 
browsers can validate whether the SSL certi
4
ain zone file for the domain example.com "Source: 
-28-2012.pdf?sequence=1
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, fail certificate
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certificate that the website operator provisioned on the operator’s website. DANE is 
similar to the CAA solution because the security dependency is reduced to single entity, 
but it differs from CAA in that it relies on the signature of the parent domain. For 
example, the keys for "example.com" can only be signed by the keys for "com", and the 
keys for "com" can only be signed by the DNS root [10].   
Although these DNS-based approaches prevent any untrustworthy signer from 
compromising anyone's keys except those in their own subdomains, the security of these 
approaches is based on the security of the DNSSEC, so the integrity of the DNS keys 
may be corrupted if the registrar for that domain is compromised. Thus, registrars still 
theoretically have the power to abuse their position because they are responsible for 
communication with the root servers. 
 
Overview 
The proposed protocol addresses the main TLS issue, the inclusion of a third party (CA) 
in the process of authenticating and securing the traffic between the user’s browser and 
the server, by making the process the responsibility of he user and server.  
The consequences of using a CA as a third party responsible for securing a user’s 
communication with the server is that the client encrypts the required security parameters 
using a certificate received from some entity claiming to be the server. This claim is 
supported by the attestation of the CA, which may lead to many types of MITM. For 
example, another entity may manage to obtain a claim that it is the server and send a fake 
certificate to the user’s browser instead of the real s rver certificate, thus taking 
advantage of the fact that browsers will automatically trust any certificate signed by a 
trusted CA or relying on the user to simply ignore b owser warnings about untrusted 
certificates. As a result, the user’s browser will create the secured tunnel based on this 
fake certificate, exposing all of the traffic to the fake certificate owner. 
In the proposed protocol, when the user tries to access a website, the browser will ask the 
user to either go through a browser plug-in to be authenticated or to register the user 
credential information if it is the user’s first visit to the website. Based on the credential 
information provided by the user, the browser will generate a public/private key pair for 
that user. Using that key pair, the secured tunnel is then created between the user’s 
browser and the server.  
In the next two sections, I will summarize the flow f messages between the user’s 







A user visiting the website for the first time will be asked to provide a username, 
password, password confirmation, and the answer to one of ten available security 
questions. This information will be provided to a browser plug-in and will be used to 
generate the public/private key pair for the user, and the browser will use the generated 
private key to sign the current timestamp of the server, which will act as a token. The 
generated public key, username, and token will be sent to the server, which will in turn 
validate the token using the received public key. The server will then generate the session 
key, encrypt it with the user public key that it received from the user’s browser and send 
it back to the browser. If the browser has the corresponding private key, it will be able to 
read the session key and start communicating securely with the server. After the 
successful setup of the secured tunnel between the user’s browser and the server, the user 
will be redirected to the website registration page to complete registration at the website. 




Figure 5: User Registration 
 
User Authentication 
When the user visits the website later, he must be authenticated through the browser 
plug-in, where the user will be asked to provide th username, password, and the security 
question/answer pair chosen during registration to generate the same key pair. The 
authentication will succeed only if the user provides the same information given during 
registration. Otherwise, an invalid public/private key pair will be generated inside the 
browser so that when the token, the signing of the current timestamp of the server with 
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the public/private key pair, is sent to the server with the username, the server will fail to 
validate the token using the registered public key and immediately terminate the 
connection with a fetal BAD_CERTIFICATE alert. (See figure 6). 
 
 







TLS protocol is the current method used for PKI security and has been subjected to 
different types of attacks in the past. Both TLS and its predecessor SSL have gone 
through various security enhancements designed to reduce the risks inherited from the 
nature of the PKI, which makes it an attractive starting point for developing any new 
protocol that is related to the concept of creating a secured tunnel between two parties. 
Although UDKP is completely independent of TLS, an investigation of the technical 
details of the UDKP protocol reveals that UDKP is amodified version of the TLS 
protocol that takes advantage of the security practices implemented in TLS after years of 
practical experience. This similarity between TLS and UDKP will make the 
implementation of UDKP much easier because it uses a similar message structure as that 
in TLS protocol. UDKP uses fewer handshake messages than TLS, but the rest of the 
UDKP sub-protocols have comparable sub-protocols in TLS, including SSL Change 
Cipher Spec Protocol, The SSL Alert Protocol, and SSL Application Data Protocol.  
In this section, we will give an overview of the TLS protocol details before describing the 
technical details of the UDKP protocol. TLS is usually implemented on top of Transport 
Layer protocols. It has been historically used prima ily with Transmission Control 
Protocol (TCP); however, it has also been implemented with datagram-oriented transport 
protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) and the Datagram Congestion 
Control Protocol (DCCP). The TLS protocol is placed between the transport and 
application layers (see figure 7), and it has two sub-layers. The lower layer is based on 
either TCP or UDP protocol and essentially comprises th  SSL Record Protocol that is 
used for the encapsulation of higher-layer protocol data. The higher layer consists of the 
following sub-protocols [14]: 
SSL Handshake Protocol: responsible for negotiating the security parameters n eded to 
establish the secured tunnel between the client and he server 
SSL Change Cipher Spec Protocol: allows the communication parties to put into 
production and begin using the negotiated parameters. 
The SSL Alert Protocol: used to exchange messages between the communicatio p rties 
to indicate any potential problems. 
SSL Application Data Protocol: takes application layer data and feeds it into the SSL 




Figure 7: TLS Logical placement "Source: Rolf Oppliger, Ph.D. (2009). Ssl and Tls: Theory 
and Practice, Artech House, Boston, London" 
 
TLS is a layered protocol that is used to create a s cured tunnel between the client and 
the server to provide data privacy and data integrity; these goals are achieved through a 
series of messages exchanged between the client and the server to authenticate each other 
and to exchange the required keys for the security operations (see figure 8). 
 
   * Indicates optional or situation-dependent message  that are not always sent. 
Figure 8: Message flow for a full handshake "Source: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5246.txt " 
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The message flow starts from the client, who sends a ClientHello message and waits for a 
ServerHello response message from the server. These two messages help the client and 
the server agree on the Protocol Version, Session ID, Cipher Suite, and Compression 
Method. After the ServerHello message is sent, the server sends its certificate followed 
by a ServerKeyExchange message if they are required according to the ServerHello 
message (e.g., the server might have no certificate, or it might have a certificate only for 
signing and so needs a ServerKeyExchange message for encryption). At that point, the 
server has sent all the data required from its side to establish the secured tunnel. The 
server might now request a certificate from the clint for client authentication, or it will 
send the ServerHelloDone message. The server will then wait for a client response, which 
will be the client certificate if the server has requ sted it. If the server did not request a 
client certificate, the client will send the ClientKeyExchange message that may contain 
either nothing or the PreMasterSecret (Once again, this depends on the selected cipher in 
the ServerHello message). The PreMasterSecret is encrypted using the server public key 
and communicated to the server. If the client has sent a certificate with signing ability, it 
will send a digitally signed CertificateVerify message to prove his possession of the 
private key in the certificate. 
Finally, a ChangeCipherSpec message is sent by the client followed by a Finished 
message, indicating that further communication willbe protected using the new 
algorithms, keys, and secrets exchanged in the hands ke. In response, the server will 
send its own ChangeCipherSpec message followed by a Finished message for the same 
goal. At this point, the handshake is over, and the client and the server may begin to 
exchange application layer data [11]. 
UDKP protocol differs from TLS protocol in the manner that it performs the handshake; 
specifically, it uses a reduced number of handshake messages. However, the remainder of 
the UDKP sub-protocols has parallels to TLS sub-protoc ls, including SSL Change 




The purpose of UDKP protocol is to provide a secured tunnel between the user’s browser 
and the server using a set of messages. As I mention d before, the messages exchanged 
between the user’s browser and the server will be similar to the messages used in TLS 1.2 
protocol to simplify the implementation of UDKP and to benefit from the best practices 
and countermeasures that are utilized in that popular protocol. 
Public Key Locator Handler 
Although UDKP is similar to TLS in the structure of the messages, changes I made in the 
handshake protocol prevent its implementation betwen the transport layer and the 
application layer. UDKP protocol now needs to interact with the application layer to 
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locate the public key for a specific user. UDKP is not only responsible for encapsulating 
packets coming from the application layer, which will move UDKP up to the application 
layer, it must also interact with the authentication server to authenticate the user. The 
server will receive the username from the browser in the authentication message, and 
depending on the implementation decision, the receiv d username will go from the 
transport layer to the application layer to be used to locate the related public key. In my 
Proof-Of-Concept (POC) implementation, I use a pre-configured public key locator 
handler that knows how to locate the public key for a specific user, and I pass this handler 
to the transport layer. In the POC, I have defined only one type of handler that knows 
how to locate the user public key from any type of relational database, but in a real 
implementation, there might be various types of handlers that are able to locate the user 
public key from different types of storage (see figure 9). 
 
Figure 9: UDKP public key locator handler 
For the UDKP to be able to complete the handshake phase, the handler needs to be 
configured in the server configuration file and thew bsite deployment engineer needs to 
both specify the handler type, which will be a datab se handler in our case, and provide 





Figure 10: UDKP database public key locator handler configuration 
 
 
Database handlers require the following information: 
className: points to the implementation of the handler, which is a database locator 
handler in this case. The development team has the option to define their custom locator 
handler implementation, or they can use the default implementation provided by the 
server. 
driverName: indicates the database vendor that is used by the webserver to store the user 
information; the database is mysql in this case. 
connectionURL: contains the location of the database and the credential information 
needed to connect to the database. 
userTable: the table that contains the user information. 
userNameCol: the column that contains the username. 
userCredCol: the column that contains the public key for specific user. 
registerURL: contains the URL to which the user will be redirected o complete the 
registration into the website. 
The complete scenario is given as follows: when the webserver starts, it creates the public 
key locator handler based on the server configuration and then waits for incoming 
connections on the UDKP port. When it receives a connection from a client, it will pass 
the public key locator handler to UDKP. Using this andler, UDKP will know how to 





The message flow begins when the user uses a UDKP-supported browser to access a 
website that is protected with UDKP protocol on the UDKP-specific port. Before 
initiating the message flow, the browser must ask the user to provide his credential 
information to the UDKP plug-in (see figure 11). 
 
 
Figure 11: Information message asking the user to access the website using the plug-in, and 
in the lower part how to get access to UDKP plug-in 
 
The UDKP plug-in has two modes of operation: the registration mode, for new users, and 
the login mode, for existing users. In the registration mode, a new user will provide a 
username, password, password confirmation, and select a security question to answer. 
The general rule of thumb is that the password will never leave the user browser; instead, 
the provided information will be used by the browser plug-in to generate a public/private 




Figure 12: UDKP plug-in Register Mode 
If the user is already registered in the website, he will go through the plug-in login mode 
to provide his username and password, select the sam ecurity question that he selected 
during registration and provide the same answer. This information will be used to 
generate the same public/private key pair that was generated during registration (see 
figure 13). 
 
Figure 13: UDKP plug-in Login Mode 
 
The browser is now ready to initiate communication with the server by sending the first 
handshake message, the ClientHello message, after which it waits for the ServerHello 
message response. Both of these messages are identical to heir peers in TLS protocol. 
 
Unlike TLS, UDKP will not send the server certificate or the ServerKeyExchange 
message, as the security of the tunnel is no longer based on the server certificate. 
Additionally, the client authentication will be through a message signed with the user 
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private key that was generated inside the browser plug-in, so there is no need for the 
server to ask for or receive the client certificate. 
When the browser receives the ServerHello message, it will respond with the 
UserAuthentication message. This is a new message th t has been introduced in UDKP 
and contains four fields: user_token, user_name, user_public_key, and auth_mode. The 
user_name is the username for the user that is logging in. The user_token is constructed 
by signing the ServerHello.random value, which contains the server timestamp; this will 
protect against replay attacks. The user_public_key is the public key generated for the 
user inside the user’s browser based on the user credential information. The final field is 
auth_mode, which will contain a zero if the user is using the plug-in registration mode and a one 
if the user is using the plug-in authentication mode. The user public key is mandatory only during 
user registration – i.e., if auth_mode contains a zero – because during authentication the public 
key would have been already stored into the server 
struct{ 
                UDKP_private-key-signed ServerHello.random user_token; 
                UserName user_name; 
                UserPublicKey user_public_key; 
   AuthenticationMode auth_mode; 
        } UserAuthentication; 
 
Once the server receives the UserAuthentication message, it will check if auth_mode is 
zero, indicating a registration attempt. In that case, the public key must be in the message, 
or the connection will be terminated with a fetal no_certificate_RESERVED alert. If 
user_public_key exists, the server will use it to recover its ServerHello.random value 
from user_token using the user public key. If auth_mode was one, indicating that the user 
is trying to be authenticated, the server will assume that the user is already registered and 
will accordingly try to locate the user_public_key using the pre-configured public key 
locator handler, which knows how to locate the user_public_key for the incoming 
username. If user_public_key was found, the server will use it to recover its 
ServerHello.random value from user_token using user_public_key. 
If the server failed to recover its ServerHello.random value from user_token using the 
user_public_key because of a missing or invalid user_public_key, the connection must be 
terminated with a fatal BAD_CERTIFICATE alert. If the value is recovered, the server 
will proceed to the next step by generating the pre-master secret that will be used to 
generate all the required session keys that would be used during the session. The method 
used to generate session keys is identical to that in TLS protocol. The PreMasterSecret 
message is also identical to its peer in TLS protocol and is communicated to the user after 
being encrypted with his public key so that no one can read it except the user himself, 
who has the related private key. 
 
  struct { 
       UDKP_public-key-encrypted PreMasterSecret pr_master_secret; 




When the browser receives the server_to_client_key_exchange message that contains the 
encrypted PreMasterSecret, it will recover the PreMasterSecret using the user private 
key. At this point, it will derive session keys from the PreMasterSecret, as specified in the 
TLS protocol, and then send a ChangeCipherSpec messag  to notify the server that all 
subsequent communications will be protected using the newly negotiated algorithms and 
keys. Finally, the client sends the Finished message, which is the first message protected 
with the new algorithms and keys. The Finished message contains a hash for all the 
handshake messages received from the server so that the server can verify that the 
security parameters the client is using are the same s those they both agreed to use and 
demonstrate no manipulation. When the server receivs the Finished message, it responds 
with its ChangeCipherSpec message, indicating that it will move to the protected mode of 
communication. Lastly, the server sends its protected Finished message. The 
ChangeCipherSpec and Finished messages are identical to their peers in the TLS 
protocol. 
 
At this point, the handshake is complete and both parties can communicate with each 
other with confidence that their communication is authenticated and protected.  
 
Implementation Considerations 
There are some considerations that must be taken into co sideration during the 
implementation of UDKP to ensure the best possible security. 
Firstly, the username that the user provides during registration must be the same as the 
username in the registered profile because the key pair generated inside the browser, 
which is sent to the server, is based on the profile username. If the user has the ability to 
change his username from the website, the public key that was sent from the browser to 
the server would be invalid because it would be based on the old username. Additionally, 
the public key cannot be regenerated by the server because the other components that are 
required to generate the key pair must not leave the user’s browser. My POC implements 
the URL for the website’s registration page as partof the server configuration; then, once 
the secured tunnel is created, the server redirects n w users to the registration page, 
where the page reads the username from the incoming request and displays it to the user 
as a read-only field. 
The second important consideration is that the username used in the plug-in login mode 
must be the same username used to authenticate the user to the website. Therefore, once 
the user is authenticated through the browser plug-in, he must be redirected to his home 
page and not to a normal login page. If a user were redirected to a normal login page, a 






In this section, various scenarios and use cases are tudied and discussed to evaluate and 
ensure the robustness of the protocol against various types of attacks. Our security 
evaluation is based on a predefined threat model with a fairly broad scope that I believe 
to be a real-world threat model. The other part of the evaluation uses the proof-of-concept 
implementation to evaluate the performance of UDKP in comparison to TLS protocol. 
Threat Model 
In my threat model I will focus on the following types of attacks: 
Registration Attack: an MITM attacker is able to insert himself as an MITM when the 
user is registering his profile for the first time in the website. 
Login Attack without Public Key: an MITM attacker is able to insert himself as an 
MITM during the login operation without previous knowledge of the user public key. 
Login Attack with Public Key: an MITM attacker is able to insert himself as an MITM 
during the login operation and knows the user public key in advance; this knowledge may 
be from a database attack or from the registration phase, where the user public key is 
transferred in the clear. 
Phishing Attack: the attacker manages to install his p ishing website as a proxy between 
the user and the real website in the hopes of stealing valuable information from the user, 
and that attacker has previous knowledge of the user public key. 
Registration Attack 
This attack is related to the user registration phase. For the purpose of simplification, I 
will consider the facebook.com website as an example, and I will assume that facebook is 
protected using the UDKP protocol. To register in facebook, I will go through the 
browser plug-in and provide my username, password, an  the security question/answer 
pair, after which I will connect to the facebook. At that time, the public/private key pair 
will be generated inside the browser based on the provided information and the following 
message will be sent from the browser to the facebook server for the sake of registration: 
 
struct{ 
                UDKP_private-key-signed Random user_token; 
                UserName user_name; 
                UserPublicKey user_public_key; 
   AuthenticationMode auth_mode; 
        } UserAuthentication; 
If the MITM attacker delivers this message to the server, the server will respond with the 
session key encrypted by my public key. Because my private key did not leave the 
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browser, the MITM attacker does not have it and thus will not be able to read the session 
key information or monitor the traffic (see Figure 14). 
 
Figure 14: MITM attacker trying to perform a passive attack during user registration 
 
The only chance for the attacker is to generate a different key pair and to send the newly 
generated public key to the facebook server in place of mine. Then, when the facebook 
server sends the session key premaster to me, it will be encrypted using the MITM 
attacker’s public key. This allows the attacker to be able to read the session key premaster 
and use my public key to re-encrypt the session key pr master and send it back to me. At 
that time, the traffic will be exposed to the MITM attacker. However, the attacker is the 
one who has registered at facebook and not me, so I will be using the attacker’s account. 
Once I try to access facebook from a clean connection, I will not be able to access it 
because the public key stored in the facebook is not my key, but the attacker’s key (see 
Figure 15). This type of attack could be mitigated by first opening a server-authenticated 
connection, then renegotiate a UDKP-authenticated connection with the handshake 
protected by the first connection. 
 
 
Figure 15: MITM attacker trying to perform an active attack during user registration by 
sending his information instead of the victim information 
27 
 
Login Attack without Public Key 
As stated above, the public key is only mandatory during the registration; thus, if the user 
was able to securely register in the website, he would have avoided the threat with the 
most risk to his privacy. Let us consider again the facebook example. When the user 
provides the username, password, and security question/answer pair to the browser plug-
in login mode and after the public/private key pair is generated by the plug-in for the 
user, the public key has been already stored in the facebook server. The server then needs 
to fetch the public key based on the received username to validate the user_token that 
contains the ServerHello.random value signed using the user private key. 
struct{ 
                UDKP_private-key-signed Random user_token; 
                UserName user_name; 
   AuthenticationMode auth_mode; 
        } UserAuthentication; 
If the attacker delivered the UserAuthentication message to the facebook server, the 
server will try to read and validate the token using the user public key. If it succeeds, it 
will respond with the session key premaster encrypted by the user public key. Because 
the user private key did not leave the browser, the a tacker will not be able to read the 
session key and hence will not be able to monitor the traffic (see Figure 16). 
 
Figure 16: MITM attacker trying to perform a passive attack during the user Login 
The attacker may only be successful by already being a registered user in facebook and to 
send his own Authentication message to the facebook server, which will then respond 
with the session key premaster encrypted with the atacker public key. However, the 
victim will be waiting for the session key premaster encrypted with his own public key, 
and because the MITM attacker does not know the user public key, he will not be able to 
communicate the session key premaster to the victim. Thus, the attack will be detected 





Figure 17: MITM attacker trying to perform an active attack during the user login by using 
his username instead of the victim username, where the attacker does not know the victim 
public key 
 
Login Attack with Public Key 
This class of attack is similar to the previous type of attack, but the MITM attacker 
knows the victim public key either through a database violation or from when the user 
registered in the website. 
When the victim sends his Authentication message, the a tacker does not pass it to the 
facebook server. Instead, the MITM attacker sends his own Authentication message to 
the facebook server, assuming that he is already a registered user at facebook, after which 
the server responds with the session key premaster encrypted with the attacker public 
key. The attacker then reads the session key premast r and re-encrypts it using the known 
victim public key. However, once the handshake is over, as mentioned in the 
implementation considerations, the username used in the plug-in login mode will be the 
same user used to login the user into his account home page. Thus, the victim will 
actually see the attacker facebook account, not the victim account, and he will be able to 





Figure 18: MITM attacker trying to perform an active attack during the user login by 
replacing his username instead of the victim username, where the attacker knows the victim 
public key 
 
UDKP and Phishing Attacks 
The main objective of phishing attacks is to steal he victim credential information 
(username, password, and security question/answer pair) so that the attacker can have 
access to the victim account later. In our case, this information will fortunately never 
leave the user’s browser. Thus, phishing attacks with UDKP protocol will be for the sake 
of traffic monitoring and they will follow the same patterns discussed previously. 
 
Proof of Concept (POC) 
For the sake of both demonstrating the functionality nd proving the concept behind 
UDKP protocol, I have made a simple implementation for the proposed protocol. In this 
implementation, I have modified TLS protocol to reflect the new changes in the 
handshake messages. I made the implementation to be as full-functioning as possible to 
reflect the accurate performance comparison results. My POC environment is a virtual 
machine that can work in four different modes: TLS Server, TLS Client, UDKP Server, 
and UDKP Client. 
In TLS Server mode, the machine runs the original versions of Tomcat 7 application 
server, OpenJDK java runtime environment, and a forum web application.  
In TLS Client mode, the machine runs the original version of Lobo web browser, and 
OpenJDK java runtime environment. 
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In UDKP Server mode, the machine runs the modified v rsions of Tomcat 7 application 
server, OpenJDK java runtime environment, and a forum web application.  
In UDKP Client mode, the machine runs the modified v rsion of Lobo web browser, and 
OpenJDK java runtime environment. 
I then made two copies of this model virtual machine: one can work as either a TLS 
Server or a UDKP Server, and the other can work as either a TLS Client or a UDKP 
Client. This yields two identical environments to pr ve the concept behind UDKP 
protocol and to measure the performance comparison of the TLS vs. UDKP protocols. 
I have not written any application from scratch for this POC. Instead, I have modified 
some of the existing open source applications. The following are the main components of 
the POC: 
1. Tomcat 7 application server (open source written in java). 
2. Lobo web browser (open source written in java). 
3. OpenJDK Java Run Time Environment 6 (open source written in java). 
4. JForum web application (open source forum written in java). 
Java runtime environment already contains the TLS protocol implementation; it acts as 
the infrastructure upon which other java applications can operate. Lobo browser is the 
client that initiates the TLS connection with the Tomcat application server using the TLS 
implementation in the java runtime environment for preventing the interception or 
monitoring of the traffic to the forum application. To simplify the task of implementing a 
fully functioning UDKP protocol, I have modified the TLS implementation inside the 
java runtime environment and changed the method that the communication parties 
(Tomcat Application Server and Lobo Browser) use to communicate with TLS protocol. 
Finally, I needed to make certain changes to the forum web application to support the 
UDKP protocol; I will talk about these changes in detail in the next section.  
I used the following procedure to evaluate the performance of the UDKP protocol in 
comparison with the TLS protocol: 
1. Run the TLS environment (TLS Client and TLS server virtual machines). 
2. Start the Tomcat in the TLS Server virtual machine a d run the Lobo browser in 
the TLS Client virtual machine. 
3. From Lobo browser in the TLS Client, request the forum application that is 
deployed in the TLS Server machine and write down the milliseconds required to 
handle that request (I modified the Lobo browser to print this value). 
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4. Issue the same request from the same browser window tw  more times and record 
the corresponding milliseconds (for subsequent requests, the session would be 
cached and the full handshake would not occur). 
5. Repeat steps 1 to 4 three times and record the average number of milliseconds 
required to handle the first, second, and third requests to the forum application. 
6. Repeat steps 1 to 5, but run the UDKP environment (UDKP Client and UDKP 
server virtual machines) instead of the TLS environme t. 
The results of the above procedure are summarized in the following table, which has two 
parts: the first part is related to the TLS protocol, and the second part is related to the 
UDKP protocol. I have three readings for the first request, which contains the full 
handshake, and I also have three readings for the subsequent requests where the session is 
retrieved from the cache. 
 
 Environment  First Request Second Request Third Request 
TLS  7719 47 32 
  2593 31 16 
  2562 47 16 
 Average 4291.33 41.66 21.33 
UDKP  5812 31 15 
  3141 47 47 
  3141 31 47 
 Average 4031.33 36.33 36.33 




As we can see in the above table, the average values for UDKP requests are less than the 
average values for TLS requests, but they are approximately the same. This is reasonable 
because, although the server no longer sends its certificate, it still needs to verify the user 
Authentication message through a database connectio; thus, the cost is approximately 
the same. However, one of the factors that control these measures is the number of users 
in the database: if there are thousands of users inside the database, the authentication will 
definitely take more time to complete. If we take into consideration that the handshake of 
the UDKP not only secures the traffic to the server but also represents the authentication 
operation for normal websites, we can conclude that the UDKP handshake has a better 
performance than TLS.  
 
Limitations 
UDKP aims to completely replace the TLS protocol; hwever, the main limitation of 
UDKP in comparison to TLS is the protocol layer. TLS protocol works in the transport 
layer, meaning that TLS usage is transparent to the application. Thus, existing 
applications can migrate easily from http to https without any change to the application 
code. Unfortunately, this is not the case with UDKP, which works in the application 
layer. To migrate existing applications to UDKP, it would require changes to the 
application code. In this section, I will talk about the main limitations of UDKP.  
Website Login Changes: according to the definition of UDKP, the application code must 
not perform the login because the user must not provide the password to the website. 
Once the user receives its website home page, he would have been already authenticated 
by UDKP; otherwise, if the authentication failed in the handshake, the server must 
terminate the connection with the user. If the user was successfully authenticated to the 
server through UDKP protocol, the application should receive the username in the 
request, and load the home page information for the user from the database using the 
username received in the request instead of using the username and the password (see 
Figures 19, 20). 
 
 
Figure 19: The original code of JForum application (pseudocode). The user information is 





Figure 20: JForum application code after modification (pseudocode). The user information 
is loaded based on the username coming from the server with the request 
 
There is one more required change for the UDKP authentication to work, which was 
discussed previously. This change is the manner of telling the server where to locate the 
user public key to be able to authenticate the user during the UDKP handshake. In my 
POC, I have implemented this change through the concept of handlers, where the server 
comes with a set of predefined handlers to handle diff rent types of storage. We can have 
database handlers to locate the public key in databases, LDAP handlers, or even custom 
handlers that the website development team can defie. I have implemented a database 
handler to use in my POC; the deployment engineer nds to configure the server with 
this handler in the server configuration file (See figure 21). 
 
Figure 21: UDKP Server Configuration 
 
Website Registration Changes: The registerURL is recommended for redirecting the us r 
to the registration page when a new user tries to register through the registration mode of 
the plug-in. For security reasons, the user must regist r with the same username used in 
the plug-in. This is because if the user changes th username in the website, the password 
and security question/answer pair must also be provided to the website to regenerate the 
public key. Providing the password and question/answer pair to the website is prohibited 
according to UDKP protocol, so the web application must receive the public key and the 
username from the browser plug-in and save them in the user database. In the registration 
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page, the password fields must be removed as they are not required and the username 
must be displayed as a read-only field (See figures 22, 23). 
 
Figure 22: The original Forum registration page 
 
Figure 23: The modified Forum registration page 
 
Clear Username: The username is getting transferred in clear during UDKP handshake, 
as it will be used to fetch the user key that is required to create the secure tunnel. This 
risk could be mitigated by first opening a server-authenticated connection, then 
renegotiate a UDKP-authenticated connection with the handshake protected by the first 
connection. 
User profile is required: For websites like search engines where the registration of the 
user profile is not required to be able to use the website, UDKP will not be able to protect 
the users' traffic to such websites. 
 
Future Work 
There are certain modifications that could be made to enhance UDKP security, 





Offline Brute Force Attack 
UDKP is vulnerable to offline brute force attacks against the 
server_to_client_key_exchange message that contains the session key premaster 
encrypted with the user public key. This message is only readable using the user private 
key. Although an MITM attacker does not have the usr private key, he knows that the 
private key has been generated based on the usernam, p ssword, and security 
question/answer pair using a known formula. Because the username is known to the 
MITM as it is transferred in the clear, the MITM attacker can try all possible passwords 
with all possible answers to the ten security question  to regenerate the public/private key 
pair. The correct password would be the one that generates the correct key pair. Each 
generated key pair would need to be tested by trying to decrypt the token that was signed 
with the user private key. This is a very serious vlnerability and must be mitigated with 
one of the following measures: 
1. Forcing passwords to have a minimum complexity to make this offline attack 
impractical. This complexity could be achieved by enforcing a minimum length of 
eight characters, with different cases and at least one number or special character. 
Additionally, the security questions must be chosen carefully so that each 
question may have thousands of possible answers. 
2. Another mitigation that could be implemented is to complicate the process of 
generating the public/private key pair by making it time-consuming. This would 
make a brute force attack impractical. For example, if the process of generating a 
key pair consumed an additional second, it would not significantly affect the user 
login operation but would make a brute force attack by generating all possible key 
pairs impractical. 
3. Finally, you can give the cautious users the option to replace the security 
question/answer pair with a randomly generated key pair and to store that key pair 
on a USB drive or smart card after encrypting the private key with the user's 
password. That will add a significant amount of protection against a brute force 
attack, and will achieve two factor authentication without modifying the 
application code. 
Unified Secured Key Pair Generation 
An important part of the protocol is to generate th public/private key pair from the 
username, the password, and the security question/answer pair. This generation must be 
very secure and unified across all protocol implementations so that all browsers can 
generate the same key pair from the given username and password. That means that all 
the implementations must use the same security questions defined by the protocol. 
These are the set of limitations and enhancements tha  need to be considered for the real 




UDKP and SSL Termination 
This is a new feature that allows the termination of secure traffic and its conversion to 
unencrypted form at the load balancer or dedicated devices. This feature has many 
benefits, mainly for increasing the site and web application performance by offloading 
the handshake and cryptography work to dedicated hardware. One additional benefit of 
the SSL termination feature is to centralize the related measurements and protection 
against the common SSL attacks in one place. This also allows the application firewalls 
to validate and check the incoming requests for application-level attacks such as SQL 
injection and cross-site scripting.  
SSL termination occurs by uploading your SSL certificate to the SSL termination device 
or load balancer, at which point it terminates a user’s SSL browsing directly. In UDKP 
protocol, there is no server certificate to be uploaded. Instead, the server will negotiate 
the encrypted connection based on the user public key that is stored in the database 
server. Unfortunately, the SSL termination devices are not involved in the user 
authentication, so they will not have access to the user public key. 
The proposed protocol could be modified such that te public key could be sent to the 
server during the login authentication mode. The load balancer could use this public key 
to encrypt the session key premaster secret and send it to the user. If the user is able to 
read the session key premaster, he knows the related private key. However, the user could 
generate any key pair and use it to authenticate any username, so as a final check, the 
load balancer must send the username and the public key to the webserver to validate that 



































According to UDKP, the password must not be provided to the website, it must be 
provided through the plug-in. However, we must consider the case if the user needs to 
change his password or he forgot his password. Then, t  user must perform the related 
operations through the plug-in to be in compliance with the UDKP protocol. 






1) Client sends Username, Token, and Public 
Key 
2) Load Balancer will validate the token using 
the received public key. 
3) If valid it will convert the traffic to normal 
http and forward the public key and the 
username to the web server for 
authentication, and finally the load balancer 
will build the secure tunnel. 
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In the case where the user wants to change his password, it is a simple process. The user 
provides the old credential information, which includes the username, the password and 
the security question/answer pair, and he will also need to provide the new credential 
information. Then, the encrypted tunnel is established using the old credential 
information, and the new public key is sent to the server to override the old key. The next 
time the user accesses the website, he will be required to provide the new credential 
information. 
There are different methods to handle the case where t  user forgot his password. One 
method is to simply send a token to the email, or some other websites send this token to a 
mobile phone that you had registered in advance with your account. Some online banks 
require you to call the bank and answer some security questions, after which the 
password will be reset to your visa pin code. The common behavior in all these options is 
that you will receive a token in some manner, and you will use this token to prove that 
you are the owner of your account and that you simply forgot your password. For UDKP 
protocol, that token could be used as the seed for a temporary key pair that would be used 
to prove that you are the legitimate owner of your website account, after which you can 
create a permanent key pair. 
 
UDKP and OpenId  
The OpenId technology makes your internet navigation s mpler by having only one 
username and password to remember. The goal of OpenId rotocol is to allow users to 
sign on to different services with a single identifier, where the authentication itself is 
performed by the OpenId provider. The OpenId provider will provide the user with an 
authentication URL that the user can use at any website that supports this technology. 
The supporting websites redirect the user to be authenticated to the OpenId provider on 
behalf of the website. When you visit a website that supports an OpenId login, look for a 
text box with an OpenId icon, type in your OpenId provider authentication URL, and you 
will be redirected to the OpenId provider to verify your identity using your OpenId 
provider credential. 
One of the main security concerns related to the use of OpenId technology is phishing 
attacks that trick users into giving away their OpenId authentication credentials. The 
attacker does not have to attack the OpenId provider dir ctly, but he can set up a 
malicious website that will redirect the user to a phishing OpenId provider URL under the 
control of the attacker. As a result, the user online identity could be impersonated. This 
risk could be reduced by using the UDKP protocol, where your identity would be proved 
to your OpenId provider using a message signed with your private key through the 
browser plug-in. Then, the OpenId provider, who is re ponsible for confirming your 
identity to other websites, only needs to keep your public key to validate your signature. 
Thus, there is no need for any password to be transferred across the internet, preventing 





The use of Public Key Infrastructure that is provided by commercial CAs has protected 
the information that flows over the Internet from being compromised, and it is a key 
solution for e-commerce applications to protect their customers. However, this model is 
under increasing pressure to adapt to market realities, ncreasingly sophisticated users and 
higher expectations of security on the public Interet. The proposed solution aims to 
build traffic security without the need to be depend t on a third party to achieve this 
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